

A Psychoanalytical Study: Memory, Naratology, Story Teller-audience, and Récit in Maurice Blanchot's The Step Not Beyond

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Abstract

This paper illustrated the new state of memory in terms of the act of representation through the notion of "récit" as the non-narrative entity outside of narratology in Maurice Blanchot, French literary theorist and novelist. This study used the argumentative method through theoretical and analytical design to move from Freud to Blanchot through discussing the notion of memory. For the present study, Freud ideas on memory were theoretically analyzed in order to prove how Blanchot goes beyond Freud and propose the new state of memory. It was proved the récit happens outside memory completely in the sense that memory is no longer perceived as the place of past experience. For Blanchot, it is because what is called the present does not pass and we live always in this present in which there is neither presence nor absence. The new term 'the extended present' was coined to imply the absence of a being in a unified entity passing from the past to present and going into the future. Being does not come to presence. Therefore, it is illusory that the past is filled with events in associative chains of meaning or narrative organization. The récit neither narrates the past nor the present; it actually illustrates the impossibility of narration. Blanchot's view of memory is an empty space in the sense that the occurrence of events lingers from the past to the present and continues in future. An event does not begin and end in a specific period of time.

Keywords: récit, extended present, empty memory.

Introduction

In the field of narratology, the main theories come from Russian Formalists, particularly Vladimir Propp and Roman Jakobson, American theories such as Seymour Chatman's *Story and Discourse* (1980), French structuralist such as Barthes (in *A Barthes reader*, Jonathan Cape, 1993), Todorov who distinguishes between discourse and historie in *Communication* (1966), and Mieke Bal in *Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative* (1997) in Netherlands. Although there is a considerable difference among these theories, and of course each theorist has concepts or categories of his or her own, these theorists agree that:

the theory of narrative requires a distinction between *story* as a sequence of actions or events, conceived as independent of their manifestation in *discourse* and discourse, the discursive presentation or narration of events[italics are my emphasis]. (Jonathan Culler, 2001, p. 169-70)

'Discourse' is the shaping and connective force and carries the power of conviction. The connective force can be the consistency between time and place which makes the narrative organized and convincing. It organizes the 'story' and gives specific meaning to it. Gerard Genette in *Fiction and Diction* has thought it as the recit and historie (1993). In this definition, the 'story' pre-exists the 'discourse' (or narrative). We must distinguish between the story as the content and the discourse as the form. American theorist Seymour Chatman (1980) in *Story and Discourse* writes that "story is the content of the narrative expression, while the discourse is the form of that expression" (23). In terms of this distinction, Chatman uses the term 'signified' to refer to the 'story' and 'signifier' to the 'discourse.' The former is threefold - event, character, and detail of setting - and the latter are those elements that can stand for one of these three (25). The notion of representation is evident in this distinction: a narrative represents a 'story.' However, in what Maurice Blanchot, French literary theorist and novelist in twentieth century, calls *récit*, such a distinction is nearly impossible. The 'story' and the 'discourse' do not figure the fiction but the resistance to this distinction produces the fiction. It challenges physicists who define time as the progression of events from the past to the present into the future which measures non-stop, consistent change in our surroundings. It actually interrupts duration. This resistance is due to Blanchot's different thinking regarding the concept of memory. Since memory is the place where events are stored and offered for narration, the concept of memory in the creation of the *récit* is so significant. Thus, Blanchot illustrates the resistance in the *récit*, in his penultimate work *The Step Not Beyond* (1992), by giving new approaching to memory. In this essay, I argue that Blanchot's concept of memory determines forming *récit*: the *récit* is built by destabilizing the concept of memory, which is conceived as the cognitive processes whereby past experience is remembered in order to be an origin for narrative. First, I begin with Blanchot's essay (2001) "The Experience of Proust" in which he discusses the phenomenon of memory. Then, I deal with *The Step Not Beyond*. As the latter work is not coherent in the ordinary sense and difficult to read, reading Blanchot first through Proust makes *The Step Not Beyond* (2001) more understandable.

Methods

This study used the argumentative method through the theoretical analytical design to move from Freud to Blanchot through discussing the notion of memory. For the present study, Freud ideas on memory were theoretically analyzed in order to prove how Blanchot goes beyond Freud and propose the new state of memory. To do this, by referring to Proust in his major novel, the existing idea of memory was broken through. Then, the literary text by Blanchot known as *recit* was analyzed to prove the new state of representation in memory. His book *The Step Not Beyond* which is both theoretical and literary was considered as the main source for the development of new state of memory.

Results

The notion of 'extended present' was coined to illustrate the new state of representation in the act of writing related to memory. This 'extended present' signifies that the present time spreads everywhere and every time, and the recounting of the past in narrative mode is impossible. This view of present proves that memory situates the self in a neutral timeless and siteless state in the act of writing. In this sense, Blanchot uses the notion of 'extended present' in the *récit* to show the problematic nature of memory of a story-teller when s/he recounts the past, since can we neither put the organizing power of narration on events nor recall past events as they are. Thus, in the notion of 'extended present' in the *récit*, one in going to his/her memory does not recount an event which is to be repeated. The *récit* presenting a new possible state in memory does not recount an event outside itself. It is the *récit* that produces the event and makes it happen.

Discussion

Having approached this account of memory, in the essay 'The Experience of Proust,' Blanchot (2001) reckons that Proust's experience of the act of recounting events, his inner revelations, are linked to a phenomenon of memory. The act is not brought about by the futile intellectual attentiveness which is involved in recalling the past, as Proust believes and which he calls *voluntary* memory (p. 44). Contrasting this, Blanchot thinks of involuntary impressions in the experience of Proust in *In Search of Lost Time* (1992) which arises from unforeseeable recognition, linked by chance. Marcel Proust writes in his novel, *In Search of Lost Time* (1992):

But since the facts which I should then have recalled would have been prompted only by *voluntary memory, the memory of the intellect*, and since the pictures which that *kind of memory shows us preserve nothing of the past itself*, I should never have had any wish to ponder over this residue of Combray. [*italics are my emphasis*] (p. 59)

Proust is disappointed to have access to his past in Combray by voluntary memory. This memory is empty of any event; it is an illusory memory. Walter Benjamin's view of voluntary memory elucidates the impossibility of access to the past:

This he [Proust] calls the *memoire volontaire*, and it is its characteristic that the information which it gives about the past retains no trace of it. 'It is the same with our

past. In vain we try to conjure it up again; the efforts of our intellect are futile.' (Benjamin, 1997, p. 112)

Voluntary memory cannot evoke the past by the will because it is, for Blanchot (2001), 'the opaque forms of logical life,' the function of intelligence (p. 45). Consciousness labours by the intelligence and reason to recall the past, but it encloses no trace of the past. In discussing the nature of storytelling, in the essay, 'Storyteller,' Benjamin notes down that a story is not constructed by the combination of some pieces of 'information', because they are standing apart from the experience of the past. They are prepared in voluntary memory. In other words, the assembly of 'information' is the function of voluntary memory. He distinguishes between 'information' and 'experience of the past:' It is no longer intelligence coming from afar, but the information which supplies a handle for what is nearest that gets the readiest hearing. The intelligence that came from afar - whether the spatial kind from foreign countries or the temporal kind of tradition - possessed an authority which gave it validity, even when it was not subject to verification. Information, however, lays claim to prompt verifiability. The prime requirement is that it appears 'understandable in itself.' Often it is no more exact than the intelligence of earlier centuries was. But while the latter inclined to borrow from the miraculous, it is indispensable for information to sound plausible. Because of this it proves incompatible with the spirit of storytelling. If the art of storytelling has become rare, the dissemination of information has had a decisive share in this state of affairs. (Benjamin, 2019, p. 88)

The 'information' furnished by intelligence is already verified because intelligence has acquired authoritative power. Intelligence receives nothing from the past; It is self-referent' and has no need to be supported by the past:

If it were the intention of the press to have the reader assimilates the information it supplies as part of his own experience, it would not achieve its purpose. But its intention is just the opposite, and it is achieved: to isolate what happens from the realm in which it could affect the experience of the reader. (Benjamin, 1973, p. 112)

The events contained in any piece of information, without having relation with the 'experience in the past,' are forced to be connected in a specified form by voluntary memory in order to produce signification: there is a lack of connection between pieces of information. Benjamin calls this kind of collecting of information the decay of the work's aura, i.e., the loss of immediacy and authenticity (Todd, 1989).

Unlike the act of 'information' completed in voluntary memory, in Blanchot's view (2001), Proust "draws, beyond reason, nothing from sensation in itself but that receives, from its image or from its renewal in an unconscious image, a unique and miraculous feeling" (p. 45). The unique image of feeling draws our attention to Benjamin's 'experience of the past' whose recounting is not possible in only one particular meaningful association:

The most extraordinary things, marvellous things, are related with greatest accuracy, but the psychological connection of the events is not forced on the reader. It is left up to him

to interpret things the way he understands them, and thus the narrative achieves an amplitude that information lacks. (Benjamin, 1973, p. 89)

Storytelling presents an immediate experience of the past because of the virtue of the singularity that is created in every telling. Interpretation, in Benjamin's view, is not opposite to subjectivity. Voluntary memory tries to impose subjectivity whereas storytelling requires the singularity of every reading which builds the 'afterlife' of any story. By means of this distinction, Benjamin rejects the voluntary memory's function in the art of the storytelling because it cannot recover an authentic experience of past. This is connoted by the word 'amplitude' which 'information' lacks. This storytelling which creates difference in every telling gives way to the oppressed tradition. For Benjamin, in *Walter Benjamin and History*, the oppressed tradition is the tradition as the discontinuity of the past in opposition to history as the continuity of events. (Andrew E. Benjamin, 2005).

Blanchot's reading of Proust regarding the unique image of a feeling is comprehensible by thinking of Proust's *involuntary* memory. For Proust, what really allows entrance to our past is our involuntary memory, namely a sudden emergence of a vivid moment from our past that happens 'by chance' when our senses meet a stimulus (an object, a taste, a sound...) already experienced in the past. As Benjamin (1973) explicates Proust's *involuntary* memory:

Therefore Proust, summing up, says that the past is 'somewhere beyond the reach of the intellect, and unmistakably present in some material object (or in the sensation which such an object arouses in us), though we have no idea which one it is. As for that object, it depends entirely on chance whether we come upon it before we die or whether we never encounter it.' (p. 112)

The experience of past by chance through meeting an object is expressed in Blanchot's language (2001) as "the meeting of present with an analogous past" which dissolutes time and "one is free of the order of time" (45). The chance is necessary because, here, it is the subjectivity that confronts the present and the past anachronically whereas subjectivity bounds itself in time.

Regarding being free of time, Blanchot's *The Step Not Beyond* (1973), which is itself a *récit*, situates memory in what he calls the 'terrifying ancient,' a temporal and a historical state:

produced itself, the event, by the absolute fall, fragile, at once falls into it, as the mark of irrevocability announces to us, it is because the event that we thought we had lived was itself never in a relation of presence to us nor to anything whatsoever. (p. 189)

This passage suggests that the present does not pass, does not leave a past behind itself and is not waiting for the future to come, a caesura, namely time out of joint. 'The terrifying ancient,' thus, implies that the memory is located in the atemporal siteless space. As Roger Laporte (2006) explains, for Blanchot, an event spans the passage of time without being present (p. 30). The *récit* does not consider the past as something passed and finished; it still continues to come. The event remains in a forgetfulness in which

there is no communication of experience between the past and the future; the experience spreads in an 'extended present.' The 'terrifying ancient' dominate unconsciousness waiting to present its hidden and unsaying containment.

For Blanchot (1973), such memory is impossible to be recalled in the category of presence/absence, since all events, which we thought we had lived, fall into the state in which they are neither experienced nor inexperienced:

But what was his part, what did he get outside of his role, which was, moreover, interchangeable, in exchanges that were never imposed on him exception his being haunted by memories over which he had so little control that he began to believe that they did not belong to him, memory of nobody, rather? He remembered, no doubt, memory so ancient of a Thing that could not be called present, nor to come. (p. 78)

In this extract, two persons have an interchangeable relation to each other. One of these two can be the other one at the same time because their past and their memory are interchangeable. Memory becomes of everybody and nobody (Blanchot, 1973, p. 10). This reminds us of Benjamin's notion of 'constellation' and the work of allegorist. The 'constellation,' for allegorist, is the assemblage of isolated fragments without possibility of totality (Benjamin, 1999, p. 211). Benjamin (1999) writes about the problematic nature of recollection by referring to the act of collecting:

Right from the start, the great collector is struck by the confusion, by the scatter, in which the things of the world are found. In particular, the world image of the allegorist cannot be explained apart from the passionate, distraught concern with this spectacle. The allegorist is, as it were, the polar opposite of the collector. He has given up the attempt to elucidate things through research into their properties and relations. He dislodges things from their context and, from the outset, relies on his profundity to illuminate their meaning. The collector, by contrast, brings together what belongs together; by keeping in mind their affinities and their succession in time, he can eventually furnish information about his objects. Nevertheless, in every collector hides an allegorist, and in every allegorist a collector. As far as a collector is concerned, his collection is never complete; for let him discover just a single piece missing, and everything he's collected remains a patchwork, which is what things are for allegory from the beginning. On the other hand, the allegorist - for whom objects represent only keywords in a secret dictionary, which make known their meanings to the initiated - precisely the allegorist can never have enough of things. With him, one thing is so little capable of taking place of another that no possible reflection suffices to foresee what meaning his profundity might lay claim to for each one of them. (211)

The collector and the allegorist are similar in the sense that they order things together based on what they mean for them exclusively not for anybody else; it could be the matter of voluntary memory. At the same time, their collection is always incomplete and without a unified meaning. In this sense, according to *Allegory and the Work of Melancholy: the Late Medieval and Shakespeare*, the difference is that for the collector the ordering is arbitrarily fixed but the allegorist constellates things to show that any collection remains

fragmentary, since a thing cannot be known through its location in a collection (Tambling, 2004). It is so because they are known based on the relation established among them. In other words, we acquire knowledge of their relationship rather than the knowledge of things in themselves. In this sense, things cannot be known in a collection or individually unless the allegorist constellates them to show how things reveal their unknown nature endlessly in an endless variety of collecting. Here, we can think of memory as a 'constellation' of events rather than mere collection. It is by the 'constellation' of events we can interchange memories of different individuals. In Tambling's view in *Allegory* in a 'constellation,' it is impossible to locate an origin, since it is the assemblage of isolated fragments (Tambling, 2010). Blanchot proposes that events, which have occurred in the past, cannot be recalled later. The past, then, becomes irrevocable. Memory, thus, Blanchot (1992) writes:

is empty and that the falling due - the infinite fall, fragile-that it designates, this infinite deep pit into which, if there were any, events fall one by one, signifies only the void of the pit, the depth of what is without bottom. (13)

Key words like 'void' and 'empty' characterize the memory as an infinite deep space in which events melt and become one with the void space of memory.

Blanchot calls the empty and void memory 'Thing' which signifies the origin which could not be located and reached. The 'Thing,' for him, is ancient implying that it is so old that could not be placed in the past. When we say present, we split between the present and the past, but the ancient past is the step (not) beyond; it brings us face to face with the ignorance of the unknown so that we forget endlessly (Blanchot, 1986, p. 3). Therefore, memory is bottomless and nothing but a void: "They remembered, but what they remembered was always less ancient than their memory" (Blanchot, 1992, p. 80). That the 'Thing' signifies the bottomlessness of memory or the void past directs us to the notion of the Neuter that Blanchot relates to the 'Thing:'

The thing, like the he/it, like the neuter or the outside, indicates a plurality characterized by singularizing itself and by appearing, by default, to rest in the indeterminate. That the Thing has a relation to the Neuter: outrages and finally in admissible supposition, in so far as the neuter cannot arrest itself in a subject noun, even this be collective, having also this movement of diverting anything to which it would apply itself from its momentaneous essence. (Blanchot, 1992, p. 73)

Blanchot characterizes memory the 'Thing,' with its neutral genderless indeterminate state, "the he/it." In approaching the 'Thing,' we find it singular in its plurality because the 'Thing' encompasses transientessence. In this state, every time that we weave memory it is singular because new weavings can be created as singular endlessly. The 'Thing' turns out to be an 'other' that always keeps its alterity and is never subsumed into totality and completeness. The otherness neutral state of the 'Thing,' a neither/nor. Non-binary relationship of a plurality to the point of indeterminacy characterizes this state:

The neuter takes the other back into itself under a light (but impenetrable) veil that seems only to force out of the other its incessant affirmation that a negative allows to grasp: the

other of the other, the unknown of the other than the one, and its refusal to be only the Other or the 'the other than'. (Blanchot, 1992, p. 74-75)

The neuter is neither illuminating nor obscuring because the 'other' is unpredictable. Memory in this neutral state is neither presence nor absence. This is reminiscent of the web of the chaotic self in Proust's novel and the elimination of the distinction between individual past and collective past which Benjamin (1997) sees in Proust: "Where there is experience in the strict sense of the word, certain contents of the individual past combines with material of the collective past" (p. 113). According to Benjamin (1997), who compares Freud's concept of memory with Proust's concept, for Proust, "only what has not been experienced explicitly and consciously, what has not happened to the subject as an experience, can become a component of the *memoire involontaire*" (p. 114).

Any writer, with his memory in its unknowability, cannot form an image of himself or seize hold of his experience. In this sense, Proust's work, *In Search of Lost Time*, for Blanchot, suggests that an individual is isolated in many ways and unable to recollect its isolated self, thus, he speaks of isolating, immobilizing. For this chaotic self, the past does not leave itself to the hand of voluntary memory to be recollected. Thus, the recollection of the scattered self is impossible. Proust (1992) shows the impossibility of the act of self-consciousness and possession of the self:

One is more distressed at having become another person, after a lapse of years and in the natural sequence of time, than one is at any given moment by the fact of being, one after another, the incompatible persons, malicious, sensitive refined, caddish, disinterested, ambitious which one can be, in turn, every day of one's life. And the reason why one is not distressed is the same, namely that the self which has been eclipsed-momentarily in this latter case and when it is a question of character, permanently in the former case and when the passions are involved-is not there to deplore the other, the other which is for the moment, or from then onwards, one's whole self; the caddish self laughs at his caddishness because one is the cad, and the forgetful self does not grieve about his forgetfulness precisely because one has forgotten. (p. 567)

Proust's narrator discusses the multiplicity of the selves within one person and also forgetfulness. The replacement of the whole self by the 'other' results in the state of being in which there is neither presence nor absence but the process of 'becoming.' In this state, memory is the place of disintegration; it is not able to retrieve the past as it was. In other words, involuntary memory is an illustration of this fragmentation of the self for Proust. It insists on one instant not on unifying some instants. This is to dissolve one's self in the experience, set it according to the fact of time and space where it occurred and consequently cut it up into pieces.

In *The Writing of the Disaster*, one argument that Blanchot makes concerning the absence of foundation in the memory and the state between being and non-being is the 'primal scene.' It actually shows the *récit* as the unrepresentability of presence. The 'primal scene' is not the first as origin. Blanchot, in a fragment, writes about the 'primal scene' that precedes the formation of the first person, the 'I' confident in his or her powers, who is

capable of remembering and forgetting. Therefore, Blanchot's 'primal scene' rejects the idea of a single substantial 'I'. Blanchot (1986) argues that there are interminable 'primal scenes' which we cannot locate of which one is primal:

(a primal scene?) *You who live later, close to a heart that beats no more, suppose this: the child - is he seven years old, or eight perhaps?- standing by the window, drawing the curtain and through the pane, looking. What he sees: the garden, the wintry trees, the wall of a house. Though he sees, no doubt in a child's way, his play space, he grows weary and slowly looks up toward the ordinary sky, with clouds, grey light - pallid daylight without depth. What happens then: the sky, the same sky, suddenly open, absolutely black and absolutely empty, revealing (as though the pane had broken) such an absence that all has since always and forevermore been lost therein - so lost that therein is affirmed and dissolved the vertiginous knowledge that nothing is what there is, and first of all nothing beyond. The unexpected aspect of this scene, its interminable feature, is the feeling of happiness that straightaway submerges the child, the ravaging joy to which he can bear witness only by tears, an endless flow of tears. He is thought to suffer a childish sorrow; attempts are made to console him. He says nothing. He will live henceforth in the secret. He will weep no more.* (p. 72)

The scene where the child witnesses his parents is not primal for Blanchot. In Blanchot's version, the child is opened to another scene, a sky which reveals nothing prior for the child. It is empty in terms of referring to an origin. This opening continues repeatedly because Blanchot says it is 'interminable.' In this sense, the scene has no absolute primacy, and is preceded by another prior scene, and that prior scene is animated by a prior one endlessly. Blanchot (1993) speaks of this point that the primary event is the matter of going back to a beginning again. It is a beginning since it is singular and unique for each person. But "it is not a beginning inasmuch as each scene is always ready to open onto a prior scene" (p. 231). Each prior scene opens onto yet another prior scene because each person comes to a set of differing and deferring relations. The deprivation of any selfhood is experienced in the primal scene when Blanchot (1986) writes the child is opened to "*the ordinary sky, with clouds, grey light - pallid daylight without depth*" (p. 72). The child or the subject 'I' is loosened to a complex obscure daylight in which the child feels what Blanchot calls a *ravaging joy*. The obscure daylight and non-confident pleasure implies the indeterminacy of the subjectivity. Therefore, the sky opens to an existence which is described as 'nothing is what there is'. The 'interminable feature' of the scene means that the scene is not an origin as such because there are endless scenes before and after it. These states of the past, present, and future enclose nothing.

Among Blanchot's works as an example for my discussion is the narrator in one of Blanchot's *récit*, *Death Sentence* (1998), who endorses plurality by commenting on the situation of man in the world: "The shadow of yesterday's world is still present for people who take refuge in it, but it will fade. And the world of the future is already falling in avalanche on the memory of the past" (p. 48). The past as a fixed entity will disappear and the future as non-finality, unpredictability, and difference is introduced into the past.

Thus, empty memory and the state between being and non-being impossibilities telling a story. Moreover, the absence of the narrator's memory in the text after those events (the suspense of the death) happened to him relates to the revelation of this state and the inability to recall the past:

Its uprightness is what actually fascinates me. When this thought appears, memory is no longer present, nor uneasiness, nor foreboding, nor any recalling of yesterday, nor any plan for tomorrow. It appears, and perhaps it has appeared a thousand times, ten thousand times. (Blanchot, 1978, p. 32)

This brings about the silence which occupies the narrator and speaks of 'an inaccessible, unreal country, closed off from everyone and most of all from myself'(Blanchot, 1978, p. 32). While the narrator experiences the suspense of death traumatically, she neither remembers nor forgets it. The event never stops and repeats thousands times.

This is also the subject of Blanchot's *Madness of the Day* (1981). The narrator in this *récit* is brought in front of the police and doctors who are representative of the law. He is asked by the law to recount what has happened to him but he cannot recount. Representatives want the *récit* from the narrator. He begins to tell the *récit* but from the very beginning, the *récit* is over because he has lost the sense of the story. This scene happens in the final paragraphs of the text which repeats the very first lines of the text: "A story? No. No stories, never again" (p. 18). According to Derrida (1979), this sentence "is inscribed at the edge of the story, at the edge of a text that recounts the demand for an impossible story" (p. 101). After "the brief vision," the 'I' in the story tells himself that this brief vision, in mid-story, marks the beginning of the end:

This brief scene roused me to the point of delirium. I do not suppose I could fully explain it to myself and yet I was secure of it, that I had seized the moment when the day, having come face to face with a real event, would now hasten to its to its end. Here it comes, I said to myself, the end is coming; something is happening, the end is beginning. I was overcome with joy.

(Blanchot, 1978, p. 10)

The state of disorientation by visiting the scene is a real event; it makes the confusion in which the event quickly comes to the end in order to begin again. This is not circularity but the renewal of the event. The 'I' does not recount a past event but he encounters an event which befalls on him from the future; it is newly experienced. In this sense, narration is impossible because the narrator needs time and place to narrate something but the narrator in the *récit*, lives in the state of delirium, the state between being and non-being, in an always-already present time. This reminds us of Nietzsche's eternal return of the same.

Conclusion

According to narratology, any narrative has representation at the heart, representing either something from the past or from the present. Therefore, narrative is inseparable from representation. An event from the past is recounted or repeated or

represented by the organizing power of the discourse. An event in the past is considered as the origin to be represented in the narrative. But, as have just seen, in Blanchot's view memory is an empty space in the sense that the occurrence of events lingers from the past to the present and continues in future. An event does not begin and end in a specific period of time, but rather we can think of an 'extended present.' In this 'extended present' which spreads everywhere and every time, the recounting of the past in narrative mode is impossible. This view of memory situates the self in a neutral timeless and siteless state. In this sense, the *récit* shows the problematic nature of memory of a story-teller when s/he recounts the past, since can we neither put the organizing power of narration on events nor recall past events as they are. Moreover, according to the notion of 'extended present,' the *récit* does not recount an event that comes from memory to be repeated. The *récit* does not recount an event outside itself. It is the *récit* that produces the event and makes it happen.

Disclosure Statements

This article illustrates Blanchot's new conception of memory going beyond Freud.

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